

Course Title: Chinese Politics

Semester: Spring 2024

Instructor: Dr. Hongshen Zhu

Contact Information: hongshen@virginia.edu

Time: Tuesday/Thursday 9:30-10:45 am

Office Hour: Gibson 164 10:45-11:59 am

Classroom: Gibson 242

Course Description:

In era of reform that began in the late 1970s, China has followed a unique path of development to achieve extraordinary economic growth, while consolidating its authoritarian rule politically. Evidence of the economic transformation is striking. Understanding the politics of contemporary China and gauging its change and continuity in recent decades is less straightforward. It is the broad goal of this undergraduate seminar.

Course Goals:

1. ability to engage in critical thinking and to formulate and support well-reasoned arguments using reliable, appropriate evidence;
2. knowledge of major issues in Chinese politics that may or may not be distinctive to China, ability to explain sources of successful performance, and nuanced grasp of political fundamentals and political challenges;
3. understanding of major questions of consensus and disagreement among China experts and assessment of evidence and methods underlying how we know what we think we know;
4. familiarity with key sources to make further progress, after the semester is over, in acquiring expertise on contemporary Chinese politics.

Resources:

China Leadership Monitor, www.prcleader.org

China Vitae at <http://www.chinavitae.com>. Biographic information of current members of the Politburo.

China Files: <https://www.chinafile.com/keyword/elites>

UCSD China Data Lab: <https://chinadatalab.ucsd.edu/resources/>

Northwestern China Data Access: <https://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/research/global-poverty-research-lab/research/projects/china-data-access.aspx>

TBD based on current affairs and updated academic publications. Check the course's online platform regularly for updates and additional materials.

Extra Credit: If you find an error in the syllabus that impacts the efficient execution of the class, the first person to note this as a comment on the syllabus will receive .5 extra credit points for the semester.

Office Hours: I am happy to speak with you during my office hours about questions you may have about the class! I will not respond to email requests about office hours, but you can make your own Google Meet appointments directly on a dedicated page on Calendly: <https://calendly.com/hongshen-zhu>

Course Communications

If you have a class, work, or another documented, unmissable conflict, during my office hours message me on Slack and we can find additional time to speak. Please reserve email only for long messages that pertain only to your personal situation. As much as possible, use the group Slack to try to get answers from the class or a speedy reply from me. Here is where you can sign up for the class Slack channel:

Course Schedule:

Week 1, 18 January: Introduction

Required: Course Syllabus

Additional:

- o Tsai, Lily L. 2017. "Bringing in China: Insights for Building Comparative Political Theory." *Comparative Political Studies*, vol. 50, no. 3: 295-328.
- o Memos from Stanford University Workshop on the State of the Field in Chinese Politics, 14-15 December 2018 at <http://www.cnpoliticsworkinggroup.org/>.
- o Carlson, Allen, Mary E. Gallagher, Kenneth Lieberthal, and Melanie Manion, eds. 2010. *Contemporary Chinese Politics: New Sources, Methods, and Field Strategies*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- o Perry, Elizabeth J. 2007. "Studying Chinese Politics: Farewell to Revolution?" *China Journal*, no. 57: 1-22.
- o O'Brien, Kevin J. 2011. "Studying Chinese Politics in an Age of Specialization." *Journal of Contemporary China*, vol. 20, no. 71: 535-541.
- o Reny, Marie-Eve. 2011. "Review Essay: What Happened to the Study of China in Comparative Politics?" *Journal of East Asian Studies*, vol. 11, no. 1: 105-135.

Week 2, 23 January: Political Economy of Development I

Required:

- o Ang, Yuen Yuen. 2016. *How China Escaped the Poverty Trap*. Cornell Studies in Political Economy. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press. Online at Duke Libraries. Chapter 1.
- o Bulman, David J. 2016. *Incentivized Development in China: Leaders, Governance, and Growth in China's Counties*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pages 14-24, chapters 5.

Week 2, 25 January: Political Economy of Development II

Required:

- o Bulman, David J. 2016. *Incentivized Development in China: Leaders, Governance, and Growth in China's Counties*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. chapters 6.
- o Cai, Hongbin, and Daniel Treisman. 2006. "Did Government Decentralization Cause China's Economic Miracle?" *World Politics*, vol. 58, no. 4: 505-535.

Additional:

- o Huang, Yasheng. 1996. *Inflation and Investment Controls in China: The Political Economy of Central-Local Relations During the Reform Era*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- o Huang, Yasheng. 2008. *Capitalism with Chinese Characteristics: Entrepreneurship and the State*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- o Lu, Xiaobo, and Pierre F. Landry. 2014. "Show Me the Money: Interjurisdictional Political Competition and Fiscal Extraction in China." *American Political Science Review*, vol. 108, no. 3: 706-722.
- o Montinola, Gabriella, Yingyi Qian, and Barry R. Weingast. 1995. "Federalism, Chinese Style: The Political Basis for Economic Success in China." *World Politics*, vol. 48, no. 1: 50-81.
- o Oi, Jean C. 1992. "Fiscal Reform and the Economic Foundations of Local State Corporatism in China." *World Politics*, vol. 45, no. 1: 99-126.
- o Oi, Jean C. 1999. *Rural China Takes Off: Institutional Foundations of Economic Reform*. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press.

- o Shirk, Susan. 1993. *The Political Logic of Economic Reform in China*. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press.
- o Wang, Yuhua. 2016. "Beyond Local Protectionism: China's State-Business Relations in the Last Two Decades." *China Quarterly*, no. 226: 319-341.
- o Wedeman, Andrew H. 2003. *From Mao to Market: Rent Seeking, Local Protectionism, and Marketization in China*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- o Whiting, Susan. 2000. *Power and Wealth in China: The Political Economy of Institutional Change*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- o Xu, Chenggang. 2011. "The Fundamental Institutions of China's Reforms and Development." *Journal of Economic Literature*, vol. 39, no. 4: 1076-1151.
- o Xu, Yiqing, and Yang Yao. 2015. "Informal Institutions, Collective Action, and Public Investment in Rural China." *American Political Science Review*, vol. 109, no. 2: 371-391.

Week 3, 30 January: Political Selection I

Required:

- o Jia, Ruixue, Masayuki Kudamatsu, and David Seim. 2015. "Political Selection in China: Complementary Roles of Connections and Performance." *Journal of the European Economic Association*, vol. 13, no. 4: 631-668.
- o Landry, Pierre F., Xiaobo Lu, and Haiyan Duan. 2018. "Does Performance Matter? Evaluating Political Selection Along the Chinese Administrative Ladder." *Comparative Political Studies*, vol. 51, no. 8: 1074-1105.

Week 3, 1 February: Political Selection II

Required:

- o Wong, Stan Hok-Wui, and Yu Zeng. 2018. "Getting Ahead by Getting on the Right Track: Horizontal Mobility in China's Political Selection Process." *Journal of Contemporary China*, vol. 27, no. 109: 61-84.
- o Xi, Tianyang, Yang Yao, and Muyang Zhang. 2018. "Capability and Opportunism: Evidence from City Officials in China." *Journal of Comparative Economics*, vol. 46, no. 4: 1046-1061.

Additional:

- o Bell, Daniel A. 2015. *The China Model: Political Meritocracy and the Limits of Democracy*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.
- o Chen, Ye, Hongbin Li, and Li-An Zhou. 2005. "Relative Performance Evaluation and the Turnover of Provincial Leaders in China." *Economics Letters*, vol. 88, no. 3: 421-25.
- o Choi, Eun Kyong. 2012. "Patronage and Performance: Factors in the Political Mobility of Provincial Leaders in Post-Deng China." *China Quarterly*, no. 212: 965-81.
- o Kou, Chien-Wen, and Wen-Hsuan Tsai. 2014. "'Sprinting with Small Steps' Towards Promotion: Solutions for the Age Dilemma in the CCP Cadre Appointment System." *China Journal*, no. 71: 153-171.
- o Edin, Maria. 2003. "State Capacity and Local Agent Control in China: CCP Cadre Management from a Township Perspective." *China Quarterly*, no. 173: 35-52.
- o Huang, Yasheng. 1995. "Administrative Monitoring in China." *China Quarterly*, no. 143: 828-843.
- o Landry, Pierre F. 2008. *Decentralized Authoritarianism in China: The Communist Party's Control of Local Elites in the Post-Mao Era*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- o Li, Hongbin, and Li-An Zhou. 2005. "Political Turnover and Economic Performance: The Incentive Role of Personnel Control in China." *Journal of Public Economics*, vol. 89, no. 9: 1743-1762.
- o Whiting, Susan H. 2004. "The Cadre Evaluation System at the Grass Roots: The Paradox of Party Rule." In *Holding China Together: Diversity and National Integration in the Post-Deng Era*, edited by Barry J. Naughton and Dali L. Yang, 101-119. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- o Cai (Vera) Zuo. 2015. "Promoting City Leaders: The Structure of Political Incentives in China." *China Quarterly*, no. 224: 955-984.

Week 4, 6 February: Elite Politics I

Required:

- o Gueorguiev, Dimitar D., and Paul J. Schuler. 2016. "Keeping Your Head Down: Public Profiles and Promotion Under Autocracy." *Journal of East Asian Studies*, vol. 16, no. 1: 87-116.
- o Shih, Victor, Christopher Adolph, and Mingxing Liu. 2012. "Getting Ahead in the Communist Party: Explaining the Advancement of Central Committee Members in China." *American Political Science Review*, vol. 106, no. 1: 166-187.
- o Jiang, Junyan. 2018. "Making Bureaucracy Work: Patronage Networks, Performance Incentives, and Economic Development in China." *American Journal of Political Science*, vol. 62, no. 4: 982-999.
- o Keller, Franziska Barbara. 2016. "Moving Beyond Factions: Using Social Network Analysis to Uncover Patronage Networks Among Chinese Elites." *Journal of East Asian Studies*, vol. 16, no. 1: 17-41.

Week 4, 8 February: Elite Politics II**Movie Week: The Transition Period (2009) Zhou Hao**

Additional:

- o Ma, Xiao. 2016. "Term Limits and Authoritarian Power Sharing: Theory and Evidence from China." *Journal of East Asian Studies*, vol. 16, no. 1: 61-85.
- o Meyer, David, Victor C. Shih, and Jonghyuk Lee. 2016. "Factions of Different Stripes: Gauging the Recruitment Logics of Factions in the Reform Period." *Journal of East Asian Studies*, vol. 16, no. 1: 43-60.
- o Pye, Lucian. 1981. *The Dynamics of Chinese Politics*. Cambridge, Mass.: Oelgeschlager, Gunn and Hain.
- o Shih, Victor. 2008. *Factions and Finance in China: Elite Conflicts and Inflation*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- o Shih, Victor. 2008. "Nauseating Displays of Loyalty: Monitoring the Factional Bargain through Ideological Campaigns in China." *Journal of Politics*, vol. 70, no. 4: 1177-1192.
- o Teiwes, Frederick. 1993. *Politics and Purges in China: Rectification and the Decline of Party Norms, 1950-1965*. Armonk, N.J.: M. E. Sharpe.
- o Xi, Tianyang. 2019. "All the Emperor's Men? Conflicts and Power-Sharing in Imperial China." *Comparative Political Studies*, vol. 52, no. 8: 1099-1130.

Week 5, 13 February: Non-Electoral Representation and Responsiveness I**Required:**

- o Chen, Jidong, Jennifer Pan, and Yiqing Xu. 2016. "Sources of Authoritarian Responsiveness: A Field Experiment in China." *American Journal of Political Science*, vol. 60, no. 2: 383-400.
- o Tsai, Lily L. 2007. *Accountability Without Democracy: Solidary Groups and Public Goods Provision in Rural China*. Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Chapter 1.

Week 5, 15 February: Non-Electoral Representation and Responsiveness II**Required:**

- o Distelhorst, Greg, and Yue Hou. 2017. "Constituency Service under Nondemocratic Rule: Evidence from China." *Journal of Politics*, vol. 79, no. 3: 1024-1040.
- o Meng, Tianguang, Jennifer Pan, and Ping Yang. 2017. "Conditional Receptivity to Citizen Participation: Evidence from a Survey Experiment in China." *Comparative Political Studies*, vol. 50, no. 4: 399-433.

Additional:

- o Dickson, Bruce J. 2016. *The Dictator's Dilemma: The Chinese Communist Party's Strategy for Survival*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- o Dickson, Bruce J., Pierre F. Landry, Mingming Shen, and Jie Yan. 2016. "Public Goods and Regime Support in Urban China." *China Quarterly*, no. 228: 859-880.
- o Distelhorst, Gregory, and Yue Hou. 2014. "Ingroup Bias in Official Behavior: A National Field Experiment in China." *Quarterly Journal of Political Science*, vol. 9, no. 2: 203-230.
- o Pan, Jennifer. Forthcoming. "How Chinese Officials Use the Internet to Construct their Public Image." *Political Science Research and Methods*.

o Wang, Yuhua. 2018. "Relative Capture: Quasi-Experimental Evidence from the Chinese Judiciary." *Comparative Political Studies*, vol. 51, no. 8: 1012-1041.

Week 6, 20 February: Congresses and Elections I

Required:

o Manion, Melanie. 2015. *Information for Autocrats: Representation in Chinese Local Congresses*. Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Chapter 1.

Week 6, 22 February: Congresses and Elections II

Required:

o Truex, Rory. 2016. *Making Autocracy Work: Representation and Responsiveness in Modern China*. Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Chapter 1.

Additional:

o Chen, Jie, Yang Zhong. 2002. "Why Do People Vote in Semicompetitive Elections in China?" *Journal of Politics*, vol. 64, no. 1: 178-197.

o Cho, Yong Nam. 2009. *Local People's Congresses in China*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

o Landry, Pierre F., Deborah Davis, Shiru Wang. 2011. "Elections in Rural China: Competition Without Parties." *Comparative Political Studies*, vol. 43, no. 6: 763-790.

o Luo, Renfu, et al. 2010. "Village Elections, Public Goods, Investments and Pork Barrel Politics, Chinese-style." *Journal of Development Studies*, vol. 46, no. 4: 662-684.

o Manion, Melanie. 1996. "The Electoral Connection in the Chinese Countryside." *American Political Science Review*, vol. 90, no. 4: 736-748.

o Manion, Melanie. 2006. "Democracy, Community, Trust: The Impact of Elections in Rural China." *Comparative Political Studies*, vol. 39, no. 3: 301-324.

o Manion, Melanie. 2009. "How to Assess Village Elections in China." *Journal of Contemporary China*, vol. 18, no. 60: 379-383.

o O'Brien, Kevin J., and Rongbin Han. 2009. "Path to Democracy? Assessing Village Elections in China." *Journal of Contemporary China*, vol. 18, no. 60: 359-378.

o Takeuchi, Hiroki. 2013. "Vote Buying, Village Elections, and Authoritarian Rule in Rural China: A Game-Theoretic Analysis." *Journal of East Asian Studies*, vol. 13, no. 1: 69-105.

Week 7, 27 February: Political Participation I

Required:

o Fu, Diana. 2017. "Disguised Collective Action in China." *Comparative Political Studies*, vol. 50, no. 4: 499-527.

o Huang, Haifeng, Serra Boranbay-Akan, and Ling Huang. 2019. "Media, Protest Diffusion, and Authoritarian Resilience." *Political Science Research and Methods*, vol. 7, no. 1: 23-42.

Week 7, 29 February: Political Participation II

Required:

o Jiang, J., Meng, T. and Zhang, Q., 2019. From Internet to social safety net: The policy consequences of online participation in China. *Governance*, 32(3), pp.531-546.

o Lee, Ching Kwan, and Yonghong Zhang. 2013. "The Power of Instability: Unraveling the Microfoundations of Bargained Authoritarianism in China." *American Journal of Sociology*, vol. 118, no. 6: 1475-1508.

Additional:

o Cai, Yongshun. 2010. *Collective Resistance in China: Why Popular Protests Succeed or Fail*. Stanford, Cal.: Stanford University Press.

o Chen, Jidong, and Jennifer Pan. 2017. "Why Do Authoritarian Regimes Allow Citizens to Voice Opinions Publicly?" *Journal of Politics*, vol. 79, no. 3: 792-803.

o Chen, Xi. 2012. *Social Protest and Contentious Authoritarianism in China*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

- o Lei, Ya-Wen. 2017. *The Contentious Public Sphere: Law, Media, and Authoritarian Rule in China*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.
- o Li, Lianjiang. 2008. "Political Trust and Petitioning in the Chinese Countryside." *Comparative Politics*, vol. 40, no. 2: 209-226.
- o Li, Yao. 2019. "A Zero-Sum Game? Repression and Protest in China." *Government and Opposition*, vol. 54, no. 2: 309-335.
- o Lorentzen, Peter L. 2013. "Regularized Rioting: Permitting Public Protest in an Authoritarian Regime." *Quarterly Journal of Political Science*, vol. 8, no. 2: 127-158.
- o O'Brien, Kevin J. 1996. "Rightful Resistance." *World Politics*, vol. 49, no. 1: 31-55.
- o O'Brien, Kevin J., and Lianjiang Li. 2006. *Rightful Resistance in Rural China*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- o Ong, Lynette H., and Donglin Han. 2019. "What Drives People to Protest in an Authoritarian Country? Resources and Rewards vs Risks of Protests in Urban and Rural China." *Political Studies*, vol. 67, no. 1: 224-248.
- o Shi, Tianjian. 1997. *Political Participation in Beijing*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
- o Zhou, Xueguang. 1993. "Unorganized Interests and Collective Action in Communist China." *American Sociological Review*, vol. 58, no. 1: 54-73.

Week 8, 2 March – 10 March: Spring Recess, No Class

Week 9, 12 March: Ideology, Political Culture, and Public Opinion I

Required:

- o Huang, Haifeng. 2015. "Propaganda as Signaling." *Comparative Politics*, vol. 47, no. 4: 419-437.
- o Jiang, Junyan, and Dali L. Yang. 2016. "Lying or Believing? Measuring Preference Falsification from a Political Purge in China." *Comparative Political Studies*, vol. 49, no. 5: 600-634.

Week 9, 14 March: Ideology, Political Culture, and Public Opinion II

Required:

- o Pan, Jennifer, and Yiqing Xu. 2017. "China's Ideological Spectrum." *Journal of Politics*, vol. 80, no. 1: 254-273.
- o Carter EB, Carter BL, Schick S. Do Chinese Citizens Conceal Opposition to the CCP in Surveys? Evidence from Two Experiments. *The China Quarterly*. 2024:1-10. doi:10.1017/S0305741023001819

Additional:

- o Huang, Haifeng. 2018. "The Pathology of Hard Propaganda." *Journal of Politics*, vol. 80, no 3: 1034-1038.
- o Huang, Haifeng, and Xinsheng Liu. 2018. "Historical Knowledge and National Identity: Evidence from China." *Research and Politics*, vol. 5, no. 3: 1-8.
- o Huang, Haifeng, and Yao-Yuan Yeh. 2019. "Information from Abroad: Foreign Media, Selective Exposure and Political Support in China." *British Journal of Political Science*, vol. 49, no. 2: 611-636.
- o Nathan, Andrew J. 1985. *Chinese Democracy*. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press.
- o Li, Lianjiang. 2016. "Reassessing Trust in the Central Government: Evidence from Five National Surveys." *China Quarterly*, no. 225: 100-121.
- o Lei, Ya-Wen. 2011. "The Political Consequences of the Rise of the Internet: Political Beliefs and Practices of Chinese Netizens." *Political Communication*, vol. 28, no. 3: 291-322.
- o Lu, Jie, John Aldrich, and Tianjian Shi. 2014. "Revisiting Media Effects in Authoritarian Societies: Democratic Conceptions, Collectivistic Norms, and Media Access in Urban China." *Politics and Society*, vol. 42, no. 2: 253-283.
- o Perry, Elizabeth J. 2008. "Chinese Conceptions of 'Rights': From Mencius to Mao---and Now." *Perspectives on Politics*, vol. 6, no. 1: 37-50.
- o Robinson, Darrel, and Marcus Tannenber. 2019. "Self-Censorship of Regime Support in Authoritarian States: Evidence from List Experiments in China." *Research and Politics*, vol. 6, no. 3: 1-9.
- o Shi, Tianjian. 2001. "Cultural Values and Political Trust: A Comparison of the People's Republic of China and Taiwan." *Comparative Politics*, vol. 3, no. 4: 401-419.

Week 10, 19 March: Media Censorship and Self-Censorship I

Guest Lecture, Professor Wang Yicheng from Washington & Lee University

Required: TBD

Week 10, 21 March: Media Censorship and Self-Censorship II

Required:

- o Jiang, Junyan, Tianguang Meng, and Qing Zhang. 2019. "From Internet to Social Safety Net: The Policy Consequences of Online Participation in China." *Governance*, vol. 32, no. 3: 531-546.
- o Gueorguiev, Dimitar D., and Edmund J. Malesky. 2019. "Consultation and Selective Censorship in China." *Journal of Politics*, vol. 81, no. 4.

Additional:

- o King, Gary, Jennifer Pan, and Margaret E. Roberts. 2013. "How Censorship in China Allows Government Criticism but Silences Collective Expression." *American Political Science Review*, vol. 107, no. 2: 326-343.
- o Roberts, Margaret E. 2018. *Censored: Distraction and Diversion Inside China's Great Firewall*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press. Chapters 1, 4, and 5.
- o Chang, Charles, and Melanie Manion. 2019. "Political Self-Censorship in an Authoritarian State: A New Theory and Evidence." Working paper.
- o Chen, Haohan. 2019. "Lies to Friends, Truths to Strangers: Anonymity, Preference Falsification, and Opinion Polarization in Authoritarian China." Ph.D. dissertation. Department of Political Science, Duke University.
- o King, Gary, Jennifer Pan, and Margaret E. Roberts. 2014. "Reverse-Engineering Censorship in China: Randomized Experimentation and Participant Observation." *Science*, vol. 345, no. 6199: 1-10.
- o King, Gary, Jennifer Pan, and Margaret E. Roberts. 2017. "How the Chinese Government Fabricates Social Media Posts for Strategic Distraction, not Engaged Argument." *American Political Science Review*, vol. 111, no. 3: 484-501.
- o Lorentzen, Peter. 2014. "China's Strategic Censorship." *American Journal of Political Science*, vol. 58, no. 2: 402-414.

Week 11, 26 March: Law and Repression I

Required:

- o Gallagher, Mary E. 2017. *Authoritarian Legality in China: Law, Workers, and the State*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Chapter 1.
- o Ong, Lynette H. 2018. "'Thugs for Hire': Subcontracting of State Coercion and State Capacity in China." *Perspectives on Politics*, vol. 16, no. 3: 680-695.

Week 11, 28 March: Law and Repression II

Required:

- o Wang, Yuhua. 2015. *Tying the Autocrat's Hands: The Rise of the Rule of Law in China*. Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Chapter 1.

Additional:

- o Data-Driven Approaches to Studying Chinese Judicial Practice: Opportunities, Challenges, and Issues. 2019. Special issue of *China Review*, vol. 19, no. 2.
- o Deng, Yanhua, and Kevin J. O'Brien. 2013. "Relational Repression in China: Using Social Ties to Demobilize Protesters." *China Quarterly*, no. 215: 533-52.
- o Diamant, Neil J., Stanley B. Lubman, and Kevin J. O'Brien, eds. 2005. *Engaging the Law in China: State, Society, and Possibilities for Justice*. Stanford, Cal.: Stanford University Press.
- o Gallagher, Mary E. 2006. "Mobilizing the Law in China: 'Informed Disenchantment' and the Development of Legal Consciousness." *Law and Society Review*, vol. 40, no. 4: 783-816.

Week 12, 2 April: Political Corruption I

Required:

- o Chen, Ting, and James Kai-sing Kung. 2019. "Busting the 'Princelings': The Campaign Against Corruption in China's Primary Land Market." *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, vol. 134, no. 1: 185-226.

Week 12, 4 April: Political Corruption II

Required:

o Ang, Y. Y. (2020). *China's gilded age: The paradox of economic boom and vast corruption*. Cambridge University Press. Chapter 1.

Additional:

- o Pei, Minxin. 2016. *China's Crony Capitalism: The Dynamics of Regime Decay*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
- o Li, Zeren, and Melanie Manion. 2019. "The Impact of Political Purge on Political Decisionmaking: Political Selection Under Extreme Uncertainty." Working paper.
- o Manion, Melanie. 2004. *Corruption by Design: Building Clean Government in Mainland China and Hong Kong*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
- o Wedeman, Andrew. 2012. *Double Paradox: Rapid Growth and Rising Corruption in China*. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press.

Week 13, 9 April: Policy Processes and Administrative Monitoring I

Required:

- o Heilmann, Sebastian. 2008. "Policy Experimentation in China's Economic Rise." *Studies in Comparative International Development*, vol. 43, no. 1: 1-26.
- o Mertha, Andrew. 2009. "Fragmented Authoritarianism 2.0': Political Pluralization in the Chinese Policy Process." *China Quarterly*, no. 200: 995-1012.

Week 13, 11 April: Policy Processes and Administrative Monitoring II

Required:

- o Dimitrov, Martin K. 2015. "Internal Government Assessments of the Quality of Governance in China." *Studies in Comparative International Development*, vol. 50, no. 1: 50-72.
- o Wallace, Jeremy L. 2016. "Juking the Stats? Authoritarian Information Problems in China." *British Journal of Political Science*, vol. 46, no. 1: 11-29.
- o Pan, Jennifer, and Kaiping Chen. 2018. "Concealing Corruption: How Chinese Officials Distort Upward Reporting of Online Grievances." *American Political Science Review*, vol. 112, no. 3: 602-620.

Additional:

- o Brødsgaard, Kjeld Erik. 2012. "Politics and Business Group Formation in China: The Party in Control?" *China Quarterly*, no. 211: 624-648.
- o Hamrin, Carol Lee, and Suisheng Zhao, eds. 1995. *Decision-Making Processes in Deng's China: Perspectives from Insiders*. Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe.
- o Heilmann, Sebastian, and Elizabeth J. Perry, eds. 2011. *Mao's Invisible Hand: The Political Foundations of Adaptive Governance in China*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Contemporary China Series.
- o Huang, Yasheng. 1995. "Administrative Monitoring in China." *China Quarterly*, no. 143: 828-843.
- o Kennedy, Scott. 2005. *The Business of Lobbying in China*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
- o Lieberthal, Kenneth G., and David M. Lampton. 1992. *Bureaucracy, Politics, and Decision Making in Post-Mao China*. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press.
- o Lieberthal, Kenneth, and Michel Oksenberg. 1988. *Policy Making in China: Leaders, Structures, and Processes*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.
- o Lorentzen, Peter, Pierre Landry, and John Yasuda. 2013. "Undermining Authoritarian Innovation: The Power of China's Industrial Giants." *Journal of Politics*, vol. 76, no. 1: 182-194.
- o Lu, Xiaobo. 2014. "Social Policy and Regime Legitimacy: The Effects of Education Reform in China." *American Political Science Review*, vol. 108, no. 2: 423-437.
- o Pearson, Margaret M. 2005. "The Business of Governing Business in China: Institutions and Norms of the Emerging Regulatory State." *World Politics*, vol. 57, no 2: 296-322.

Week 14, 16 April: Conceptualization of the Regime I

Required:

- o Ringen, Stein. 2016. *The Perfect Dictatorship: China in the 21st Century*. Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press. Chapter 5.
- o Ji, Chengyuan, and Junyan Jiang. 2020. "Enlightened One-Party Rule? Ideological Differences between Chinese Communist Party Members and the Mass Public." *Political Research Quarterly*.

Additional:

- o Nathan, Andrew J. 2003. "Authoritarian Resilience." *Journal of Democracy*, vol. 14, no. 1: 6-17.
- o Qiang, Xiao. 2018. "The Rise of China as a Digital Totalitarian State." *New Perspectives Quarterly*, vol. 35, no. 2: 37-39.

Week 14, 18 April: Student Presentations of final papers**Week 15, 23 April, 25 April: Student Presentations of final papers****Assessment:**

1. Class Participation (20%): Active participation in class discussions is expected and will be graded.
2. Presentations (20%): A in-class presentation of final paper findings in week 14/15.
3. Final Paper (60%)
 - Research question, hypothesis (due end of Week 6, February 25 11:55 pm) 10%
 - Rough draft (due end of Week 11, March 31 11:55 pm) 10%
 - Complete paper (due last day of the semester, May 19 11:55 pm) 40%

The final paper should explore one of the aspects of Chinese politics writ large. Your research paper must ask and answer a tractable question that is not in the stark, binary form adopted above. It could ask about the effect of one variable on another or the extent to which something has changed. The paper must be analytical, not a simple descriptive narrative. You must begin with a general expectation of what to find, then a discussion of findings from your sources. I do not expect a quantitative analysis, but I do require use of some primary sources, which may be in translation. You must identify and use a sufficient number of appropriate, high-quality scholarly sources. Students should incorporate at least five peer-reviewed sources and make a clear argument based upon a question that they have identified within this field. For evaluation criteria, please see below.

For students that enroll in graduate 5000-level section:

Two books are required for reading in their entirety:

- o Bulman, David J. 2016. *Incentivized Development in China: Leaders, Governance, and Growth in China's Counties*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- o Ma, Xiao. 2022. *Localized Bargaining: The Political Economy of China's High-Speed Railway*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Their final paper needs to have quantitative analysis and are expected be around 25 pages.

Phase 1: 2-3 page paper prospectus

Should include brief contexts of your research question, the research question itself, and your hypothesis, potential sources of evidence (data and/or primary sources).

What is a Research Question?

<https://twp.duke.edu/sites/twp.duke.edu/files/file-attachments/research-questions.original.pdf>

Phase 2: 7 page rough draft

The rough draft (for peer review and professor review) should include:

1. 7 pages of prose
2. A clear thesis
3. Correct in-text citation in Chicago author-date style (the Chicago Manual of Style is available here through the UVA library.
4. A bibliography in Chicago author-date style covering all texts cited in the first eight pages

Phase 3: Complete paper

There is no hard page limit. Normally students turn in ~15 pages.

Writing Evaluation Criteria:

The following criteria will be used when grading all writing assignments.

Grade	Argument	Grammar	Language Use	Research	Citation	Points Range
A	Brilliant and compelling.	Flawless.	Clear and inspired.	Seamless integration of fresh, innovative material demonstrating extensive research.	All materials cited perfectly.	57-60
A-	Clear and strong.	Near perfect.	Excellent.	Innovative material from extensive research.	Few to no citation errors.	54-56.9
B+	Clear.	Very few errors.	Excellent.	Effective outside research.	Few citation errors.	52-53.9
B	Clear.	Minimal errors.	Generally good.	Effective research.	Multiple citation errors.	49-51.9
B-	Clear.	Minimal errors.	Good, occasional clarity issues.	Sufficient research to support claims.	Multiple errors in citation.	46-48.9
C+	Unclear.	Regular errors.	Frustrating and unclear.	Limited, but effective to support claims.	Majority of sources not cited, multiple errors.	44-45.9
C	Unclear.	Regular errors.	Often frustrating and unclear.	Limited research not well-integrated.	Many uncited sources, multiple errors.	40-43.9
C-	Very unclear.	Consistent errors.	Frustrating and unclear.	Minimal to none.	Majority of sources not cited, multiple errors.	37-39.9
D	None.	Abound with errors.	Very unclear.	Minimal to none.	Most materials not cited, no references.	30-36.9
F	None.	Abound with errors.	Extremely unclear.	None.	No references. Any paper found plagiarized will automatically receive 0 points.	0-29.9

Academic Integrity:

The University is committed to upholding the highest standards of academic integrity. All work submitted in this course must be your own, and any sources used must be properly cited.

Accommodations for Students with Disabilities:

If you require academic accommodations due to a documented disability, please communicate your needs to the instructor.